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 Developing a Sectoral New Market Mechanism – Insights from 
Theoretical Analysis and Country Showcases 
 
Abstract: 
Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) have 
decided to establish a “new market-based mechanism” (NMM) to promote mitigation 
across “broad segments” of developing countries’ economies but have so far defined only 
some broad outlines of how it is to function. This article identifies key design options of 
the NMM based on a survey of the literature and reviews them against a range of 
assessment criteria. Furthermore, potential application of the NMM is analysed for five 
country-sector combinations. The analysis finds that lack of data and of institutions that 
could manage the NMM are key bottlenecks. In addition, the analysis reveals the existence 
of substantial no-regret reduction potential, suggesting that sectors may not be sensitive to 
the market incentives from an NMM. Governmental capacity building and nationally 
appropriate mitigation actions (NAMAs) might be more appropriate on the short term, 
preparing the ground for the adoption of market-based approaches at a later stage. NMM 
pilots could be based on supported NAMAs but should ideally generate tradable and 
compliance-grade emission credits in order to fully simulate the real-life conditions of an 
NMM.   
Policy Relevance: 
The Doha conference identified “possible elements” of the NMM to be addressed in the 
development of the NMM’s modalities and procedures. This article identifies available 
options for these possible elements and reviews these options against a number of criteria, 
including environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency, political and administrative 
 efficiency, and others. On this basis the article identifies options that are best suited to 
fulfil the main aims of the NMM as decided at the Durban conference, “to enhance the 
cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions”. In addition, the article analysis 
potential application of the NMM for five country-sector combinations. The analysis 
assesses the emission reduction potential that could be mobilised through the NMM as well 
as the institutional market readiness of the sectors. Finally, the article synthesises the 
challenges ahead for the NMM that have emerged from the analysis and suggests possible 
ways forward. 
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 Introduction 
The Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 
have been discussing options for scaling up existing and/or introducing new market 
mechanisms (NMMs) at the sectoral level for many years. These discussions have been 
partly inspired by perceived weaknesses of the existing Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM). The CDM has been seen as a success in leveraging private sector finance and in 
helping build capacity for measuring, reporting and verification (MRV) of emissions and 
emission reductions. However, critics have complained about lengthy and costly project 
registration and credit issuance procedures and the weak coverage of key sectors (such as 
demand-side energy efficiency and transport). Furthermore, many have also been 
disappointed because CDM project activities have so far been concentrated in relatively 
few countries and regions while, for example, most of Africa has so far been bypassed. 
Several studies have also questioned the additionality of a large percentage of the CDM 
project portfolio. Due to its design as a project-based mechanism, some have also seen the 
CDM as fundamentally incapable of achieving essential structural changes as needed to 
effectively combat climate change (achievements and shortcomings of the CDM are for 
example discussed in Haya, 2009; Schneider, 2009; Spalding-Fecher et al., 2012).  
The discussion on NMMs has also been driven by the desire of industrialised countries to 
more strongly involve the large emerging economies in the international climate protection 
efforts. For example, the EU has argued that keeping global temperature increase below 
2°C as agreed in Copenhagen will require substantial deviations from currently projected 
emission trajectories in developing countries, and that achieving such deviations will 
require broadening the scope and coverage of market-based mechanisms. In the EU’s view, 
“a project-based system alone cannot be sufficient to pursue low-emission pathways, 
 therefore new market-based mechanisms are needed to allow us to stay within the 2 
degrees target.” (UNFCCC, 2011, 49). 
After several years of protracted discussions, in December 2011 in Durban the seventeenth 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC decided to “define” a NMM but did not 
stipulate operational details (UNFCCC, 2012a). COP decisions have so far only defined 
some very broad outlines of the NMM. The NMM is supposed to promote mitigation 
across “broad segments” of developing country economies, may operate on a sectoral 
and/or project-specific basis, and is to achieve a net decrease and/or avoidance of 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. The COP’s Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA) is tasked with developing detailed modalities and 
procedures (UNFCCC, 2013a). 
As the challenges of sectoral approaches are largely different from those of project-based 
approaches, this article limits itself to the sectoral perspective. The term “sector”, however, 
is open to interpretation and has indeed been criticised as ambiguous by some. Prag and 
Briner (2012, 26), for example, suggest to rather refer to “groups of emitters”. This article 
nevertheless uses the term sector as it is the term that has been established in this 
discussion context. But the term is used here in a generic sense, as boundaries of NMM 
coverage may indeed be drawn in various ways, as discussed in this article. 
While COP decisions have so far remained vague due to political differences among 
Parties, the issue as such is not new and undefined. As evidenced in their submissions, the 
views of many Parties are much more elaborate than has so far been reflected in COP 
decisions (see e.g. UNFCCC 2012b, summarised and analysed in IGES, 2012; Sterk, 2012; 
UNFCCC, 2012c). In addition to discussions among Parties, researchers have discussed 
possibilities for scaling up the CDM to the sectoral level or creating a new sectoral 
 mechanism for more than ten years already and there is hence a very rich literature on 
options for sectoral carbon market mechanisms (see e.g. Samaniego and Figueres, 2002; 
Sterk and Wittneben, 2006; Schmidt et al., 2008; Baron et al., 2009; Meckling and Chung, 
2009; Schneider and Cames, 2009; Butzengeiger et al., 2010; Helme et al., 2010; Bolscher 
et al., 2012).  
This article aims to contribute to the discussion on further development of the NMM. 
There are two core sets of challenges that need to be overcome. First, Parties need to agree 
on core design elements of the NMM. To support the political discussion the article 
identifies key design options for the NMM based on a survey of the literature and assesses 
these options against a range of assessment criteria. Based on this assessment, the article 
reflects on what options would be best suited to maximise environmental effectiveness and 
economic efficiency, the main goals of the NMM.  
The second challenge to NMM development is actual implementation. Some of the above-
listed research has cast doubts on the actual practical feasibility of sectoral mechanisms for 
developing countries. In addition to the discussion of design issues, the article therefore 
also discusses potential application of the NMM for four sectors in five countries. The 
analysis assesses the emission reduction potential that could be mobilised through the 
NMM as well as the institutional market readiness of the sectors.  
Finally, the article synthesises the challenges ahead for the NMM that have emerged from 
the analysis and discusses possible ways forward. 
1 Overview of Key Design Elements and Options for the 
NMM 
This section discusses design elements that in the view of the authors would need to be 
covered in the modalities and procedures for the NMM. Decision 1/CP.18 includes 
 “possible elements” of the NMM to be taken into account by the SBSTA in the 
development of the NMM’s modalities and procedures (UNFCCC, 2013a, para 51): 
“(a) Its operation under the guidance and authority of the Conference of the 
Parties; 
(b) The voluntary participation of Parties in the mechanism; 
(c) Standards that deliver real, permanent, additional, and verified mitigation 
outcomes, avoid double counting of effort and achieve a net decrease and/or 
avoidance of greenhouse gas emissions; 
(d) Requirements for the accurate measurement, reporting and verification of 
emission reductions, emission removals and/or avoided emissions; 
(e) Means to stimulate mitigation across broad segments of the economy, which are 
defined by the participating Parties and may be on a sectoral and/or project-
specific basis; 
(f) Criteria, including the application of conservative methods, for the 
establishment, approval and periodic adjustment of ambitious reference levels 
(crediting thresholds and/or trading caps) and for the periodic issuance of units 
based on mitigation below a crediting threshold or based on a trading cap; 
(g) Criteria for the accurate and consistent recording and tracking of units; 
(h) Supplementarity; 
(i) A share of proceeds to cover administrative expenses and assist developing 
country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate 
change to meet the costs of adaptation; 
(j) The promotion of sustainable development;  
(k) The facilitation of the effective participation of private and public entities;  
(l) The facilitation of the prompt start of the mechanism”. 
 The authors consider that some of these elements can be grouped together and that not all 
warrant a detailed discussion. Elements (a), (b) and (g) are in the view of the authors issues 
of national and international governance arrangements while elements (c), (d) and (f) are 
issues of emission accounting. Facilitation of effective participation (element k) is in the 
view of the authors a function of the adequacy of available means to stimulate action 
(element e). Facilitation of a prompt start (element l) is in the view of the authors mainly 
an issue for the starting period of the NMM with little bearing on its core operational rules. 
For the CDM, Decision 17/CP.7 facilitated a prompt start by starting operation of the 
mechanism immediately, not waiting for the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol, and by 
allowing retroactive crediting of projects starting as of the year 2000, even before the 
adoption of the Marrakesh Accords, which defined the modalities and procedures of the 
Kyoto mechanisms (UNFCCC 2002). 
Supplementarity (element h), the principle that use of flexible mechanisms shall only 
complement and not replace domestic action by the buyer country, was subject to intense 
discussions during the negotiations of the Marrakesh Accords but Parties were not able to 
agree on a quantified definition, partly for political and partly for technical reasons 
(Yamin, Depledge, 2004). The authors consider that further attempts to quantitatively 
define supplementarity would encounter the same problems and given space limitations 
chose not address this issue in this article.  
The authors also opted not to address element j, the promotion of sustainable development. 
This issue was equally divisive during the Marrakesh negotiations and is a highly complex 
matter. Methodologies such as the CDM Gold Standard run to dozens of pages (The Gold 
Standard 2012), a discussion would thus warrant an entire article by itself and would 
probably be a matter for a technical body rather than the COP. 
 Based on these considerations, the article discusses a set of design elements as listed in 
Table 1. The order of the elements is different from the list in Decision 1/CP.18. For 
example, the authors consider that an assessment of options for governance arrangements 
should be preceded by a discussion of how the mechanism is supposed to function. Based 
on the available literature, for several elements various sub-elements can be identified that 
warrant being discussed separately. Means to stimulate actions may be established 
nationally or internationally, and may consist of direct incentives, such as issuance of 
emission credits, or more indirect ones, such as possibilities for banking and borrowing. 
Emission accounting is a question of system boundaries, the setting of targets or reference 
levels and MRV provisions. The COP will also need to decide how to account for potential 
overlaps of the NMM and the existing CDM. However, given space limitations the 
discussion leaves out issues that are probably better left to be dealt with by the regulatory 
structure to be established in the modalities and procedures, such as details of procedures 
for the establishment of baselines and the MRV of emissions and/or reductions. 
The grouping of elements and sub-elements is not always clear-cut. For example, temporal 
flexibility provisions are not only an incentive but also an accounting issue. Therefore, 
Table 1 does not aspire to be a definite list but only to group the issues into a workable 
structure for the purpose of this article. 
Table 1: Structure of NMM Design Elements as Discussed in the Article 
No. Design Element Sub-elements and Options 
1 International means to stimulate 
mitigation actions 
Crediting or trading 
Temporal flexibility 
2 National means to stimulate mitigation 
actions 
Government policies and measures (PAMs), installation-level crediting, or 
binding installation targets 
3 Emissions accounting System boundaries 
Establishment of reference levels 
Relationship of CDM and NMM 
4 National governance framework Government agencies or independent agencies 
5 International governance framework Approval by CDM Board, new regulatory body, or by the COP 
CDM Board model or full-time professional body 
Assessment process following CDM model or inventory review model 
 
 2 Assessment of Design Options 
The following discusses the respective advantages and disadvantages of the different 
options. This discussion is based on seven assessment criteria, as listed in Table 2. The 
criteria were derived from the literature on assessing climate policy instruments but given 
space limitations the presentation of the findings focuses on the criteria that, in the opinion 
of the authors, are the most important for a specific design element. For more detailed 
discussions of design issues see e.g. Schneider and Cames (2009), Butzengeiger-Geyer et 
al. (2010), Bolscher et al. (2012). 
Table 2: Assessment criteria for evaluating design options for developing the 
NMM 
No. Assessment criteria 
1 Environmental effectiveness: the extent to which an option contributes to emission reductions 
2 Environmental integrity: the extent to which an option contributes to assuring that a claimed tonne of 
CO2 reduction is indeed a tonne 
3 Administrative feasibility, including transaction costs: the extent to which an option affects the 
opportunity to meet the need for appropriate data, information and administrative capacity 
4 Political feasibility: the extent to which an option is likely to be accepted by policy-makers and 
stakeholders 
5 Economic efficiency: the extent to which an option contributes to achieving emission reductions at the 
lowest social cost 
6 Private sector participation: the extent to which an option incentivises or enforces private sector 
participation and investment 
7 Potential impacts on competitiveness: the extent to which an option positively or negatively impacts 
competitiveness of covered companies 
 
While all seven criteria are considered important by the authors, environmental 
effectiveness and integrity as well as economic efficiency may be considered as most 
important, based on the fundamental aim of the NMM as decided by Parties in Durban, “to 
enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote, mitigation actions” (UNFCCC, 2012a, 
para. 83). Therefore, each sub-section will conclude with a synthesis on which design 
options would be the most promising for maximising mitigation outcomes and economic 
efficiency. 
 2.1 Element 1: International Means to Stimulate Mitigation 
Actions 
2.1.1 Crediting or Trading 
There are two basic approaches to establishing an emission market mechanism, the 
baseline-and-credit approach, used by the CDM and other offset mechanisms, and the cap-
and-trade approach, used by the EU emission trading system (EU ETS) and others. In the 
context of developing a sector-based NMM these have usually been referred to as sectoral 
crediting and sectoral trading.  
In sectoral crediting, a country would adopt a target for a sector and credits would be 
issued ex-post if emissions were subsequently reduced below the target. There would be no 
penalty if emissions were above the target; such targets are often referred to as “no-lose 
targets”. The no-lose character would probably enhance the political acceptability to 
developing countries. However, as reaffirmed in China’s latest UNFCCC submission on 
the NMM, especially the large emerging economies have in the past been rather negative 
towards any kind of sectoral approaches as they view them as a “slippery slope” that may 
eventually lead to binding commitments. China has therefore argued that the NMM should 
be project-based and similar to the CDM (UNFCCC, 2012b). 
Due to the non-binding nature of sectoral crediting, there would be no certainty about the 
environmental effectiveness of the system. It would only lead to emission reductions if the 
international carbon price was sufficiently high to provide proper incentives and if the 
target was set at an appropriate emission level (Ward et al., 2008). Based on current 
pledges, the supply from the existing Kyoto mechanisms may be sufficient alone to satisfy 
global demand for international offsets up to 2020 (Kossoy and Guigon, 2012). Another 
drawback is the ex-post credit issuance, which provides limited capital flow for 
investments and thus is an obstacle to private sector participation and overall effectiveness. 
Ex-post issuance limits bankability as it entails substantial risks. Ex ante, participants 
 cannot be sure whether their proposal will be approved, whether they will actually achieve 
the expected amount of emission reductions and which price they will receive for the 
credits. Relying on carbon credit revenues to make an otherwise unprofitable scheme 
profitable is therefore an uncertain proposition. Some critics claim that due to these reasons 
the CDM is hardly ever a make-or-break factor when deciding to proceed with a project 
and that this has been confirmed by project developers (Haya, 2009).  
Furthermore, if a non-binding crediting approach is applied at a sectoral level, there may 
be situations where some installations successfully reduce their emissions while others do 
not, so that the overall sectoral target may be missed. To provide actual participation 
incentives, the crediting of individual installations would therefore need to be decoupled 
from the performance of the sector as a whole, which is discussed in more detail in section 
2.2. 
In sectoral trading, a country would adopt a binding emissions target for a sector and 
receive tradable units ex-ante. If emissions were subsequently reduced below the target, the 
resulting surplus of units could be sold in the carbon market, while in case of a shortfall the 
country would need to buy additional units. An advantage of this approach is that a binding 
target gives certainty about the environmental outcome and a clear political signal to 
emitters, which may facilitate investments. Also, due to the ex-ante allocation of 
allowances, trading can be conducted right from the beginning and not only ex-post as in 
the case of today’s CDM and the proposed sectoral crediting mechanism (Butzengeiger-
Geyer et al., 2010). However, the political feasibility of binding targets is probably even 
lower in many developing countries than sectoral crediting. While this issue is not 
explicitly addressed in Parties’ submissions on the NMM, in the context of the negotiations 
on the 2015 agreement many developing countries continue to be strongly opposed to 
suggestions that they should adopt binding commitments (Allan et al., 2013). 
 Overall, the choice between sectoral crediting and sectoral trading may not have much 
impact on environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. While due to its binding 
nature sectoral trading would have the advantage of guaranteeing a certain emissions 
outcome, the risk of penalties might induce countries to adopt only weak targets. One may 
also consider that adopting binding targets would send a clearer signal to investors, but 
investment incentives would largely be determined by the stringency of the target and by 
how the system would be implemented domestically (see section 2.2). Bindingness does 
not automatically constitute environmental effectiveness, as is for example currently being 
demonstrated by the EU. The EU’s 2012 emissions were almost 20% below 1990 levels 
(EEA, 2013), so the EU’s commitment in the second Kyoto period only amounts to 
keeping its emissions stable for the rest of the decade. And there currently is no indication 
that the EU will be able to agree on strengthening its target. South Korea offers an example 
of a target that is not binding internationally but nonetheless ambitious, the carbon price in 
the South Korean ETS that is to start in 2015 is projected to go well beyond 100 USD/t 
CO2-eq. within its first years unless price containment mechanisms are implemented 
(Bloomberg, 2013).    
2.1.2 Temporal Flexibility 
Choices have to be made regarding several timing issues. First, the length of the 
crediting/trading period. On the one hand, long periods provide more investment certainty 
and thus promote private sector participation and overall economic efficiency, but on the 
other hand short periods provide more possibilities to address design flaws which may 
undermine environmental or economic efficiency. The EU has tried to balance these 
factors in its ETS by starting with short initial periods followed by longer periods after 
experience had been gained. However, in addition to inherent design flaws there are 
always risks from exogenous uncertainties such as macroeconomic cycles. And in the 
international context it would probably hardly be possible to adapt countries’ (sectoral) 
 targets to changed circumstances once they have been adopted, as illustrated by the EU’s 
inability to increase its target. From the environmental perspective, short periods are 
therefore preferable to avoid a lock-in of low ambition. Promoting economic efficiency by 
providing investor confidence could be addressed at the level of domestic implementation 
(see section 2.2).  
Second, compliance flexibility can be enhanced by the option of saving credits/allowances 
to future periods (banking) and borrowing from future periods for use in the current period. 
These options enhance economic efficiency and foster carbon price stability as they allow 
countries and firms to smooth their emission profiles through economic cycles. Banking 
provides incentives for early action. Such incentives are most relevant if targets are 
binding, but may also be of interest if targets are non-binding, for example if the 
expectation is that carbon prices will increase in the future or if a government expects that 
it will have to adopt a binding target in the following period. However, banking also makes 
it more difficult to correct over-allocation/over-crediting in subsequent periods. The 
criteria of environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency therefore point in different 
directions on this issue. 
Borrowing is usually frowned on from an environmental perspective as it provides 
incentives to delay mitigation actions and entails the risk that they may not be taken in 
future periods either, for example if companies go bankrupt (Boemare and Quirion, 2002). 
In the context of an NMM operating at government level there is also the risk that 
countries may decide to terminate the agreement. 
2.2 Element 2: National Means to Stimulate Mitigation Actions 
As emission targets or thresholds would be set at the sector level, the mechanism would 
probably have to be operated by the host country government as private entities could 
 hardly take responsibility for entire sectors. This raises the question how to constitute 
incentives for those who are supposed to undertake the emission reduction investments. 
The following basic options can be conceived. 
In option 1, the host country government would implement non-ETS policies and measures 
(PAMs) to reduce emissions. The government retains all credits/allowances that are issued 
and uses them to co-finance policy implementation. Governments generally have a broad 
range of policy options at their disposal, such as energy/CO2 taxation, mandatory 
efficiency standards, renewable feed-in tariffs or other forms of financial support (Gupta et 
al. 2007). As no trading units are issued to individual installations, emissions could be 
accounted at the aggregate sectoral level based on statistical data such as fuel statistics, 
which reduces transaction costs.  
The reduction of transaction costs entailed by accounting for emissions at an aggregate 
level may facilitate the participation of countries that have not been able to participate in 
the CDM, which has partly been caused by the substantial installation-level MRV required 
under the mechanism. Some analysts also consider that implementing PAMs might be 
easier for poorer countries than trying to attract individual investment projects (Sugiyama, 
Yamaguchi & Yamagata, 2005). 
Environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and incentives for private sector 
participation would strongly depend on what PAMs are implemented. Some policies such 
as banning outdated technology can achieve very considerable emission reductions at very 
low transaction costs (Schneider and Cames, 2009). This government-led approach could 
also facilitate the blending of carbon finance from the NMM with other sources of 
domestic or international climate finance (Prag and Briner, 2012). 
 In option 2, the government would pass the sectoral target on to the individual installations 
within the sector. Each installation would be assigned its own emission target. If an 
installation achieves its target, it receives credits. If not, there are no penalties.  
Hence, installations would be directly exposed to the carbon price signal. The regulatory 
risk for investors would be much lower than under the CDM as there would be no question 
about eligibility, which would be determined top-down, and thus sectoral crediting might 
even be able to actually drive financing decisions (Marcu, 2009). 
However, since target achievement would not be mandatory for installations, there may be 
situations where some individual installations successfully reduce emissions but others do 
not and thus the sector as a whole does not. Therefore, the sector as such would not be 
eligible for credits but individual installations would be. If installations that reduce 
emissions run the risk of not being rewarded because of the failures of others, the system 
would hardly provide an incentive to reduce emissions. The crediting of individual 
installations would need to be decoupled from the performance of the sector as a whole. 
The literature discusses various options (e.g. Baron, et al. 2009; Helme et al., 2010; Marcu, 
2009; Harrison et al., 2011). One option would be for the host country government to take 
on the risk and guarantee to provide credits to installations that reduce their own emissions 
regardless of the overall sector performance. However, this does not reduce the risk, it 
merely shifts it from the installations to the host country government, which may not have 
much appetite for assuming such risks, so political feasibility of this option may be low. 
Another option, which might be politically more acceptable to developing countries, would 
be to hold back a share of the credits issued to form a reserve. The government could also 
try to reduce the risk of sectoral non-performance by implementing additional policies to 
reduce sectoral emissions (that is, combining options 1 and 2). But if both government and 
 installation operators work to reduce emissions, the question is who of them deserves 
which share of the credits for the overall sectoral reduction. 
The most straightforward approach may be option 3, to make the installation-level targets 
mandatory with penalties attached. These could either be financial penalties, which could 
be used by the government to purchase trading units if needed, or obliging the companies 
themselves to purchase trading units if they have excess emissions. The government could 
also introduce a fully-fledged emissions trading system. Option 3 would ensure that each 
installation has an incentive to reduce emissions and would provide high environmental 
certainty. However, as regards political feasibility affected companies may be expected to 
strongly resist the imposition of mandatory targets. 
If the sectoral target is passed on to the installation level (options 2 and 3), emissions 
accounting will also need to be done at installation level, which would significantly 
increase administrative complexity and the lead-time for implementation. Butzengeiger-
Geyer et al. (2010) consider that national implementation even in the base case (option 1) 
is likely to take at least three years. If implementation is done on an installation basis, 
national implementation would in their view require an additional one to two years. 
It bears noting that the above are prototypical options, in reality one can expect a 
combination of option 1 with option 2 or 3, as there will always be some policies already in 
place and further ones are likely to be introduced in parallel or later for climate- or non-
climate reasons, such as air quality. If designed effectively, such a hybrid of emission 
pricing and other PAMs arguably also provides the best prospect for maximising both 
environmental effectiveness and economic efficiency. Systems based only on emission 
prices can be expected to perform well on a short-term basis (static efficiency) but entail a 
risk that the focus of action is laid on short-term rather than long-term considerations (thus 
 neglecting dynamic efficiency). For example, new technologies may be neglected which in 
their infancy have high costs but may ultimately become the most cost-effective option 
(Weber and Hey, 2012). This is exemplified by the CDM, which has thousands of hydro 
and wind energy but only few solar energy projects (UNEP Risø, 2014). At the same time, 
targeted support instruments such as feed-in tariffs have induced strong deployment and 
technological learning that has reduced equipment costs of solar photovoltaics by about 
80% within the last five years (Liebreich, 2013). Effectively reducing emissions therefore 
requires a portfolio of policies tailored to fit the specific circumstances (Gupta et al. 2007). 
2.3 Element 3: Emissions Accounting 
2.3.1 System Boundaries 
Systems may cover entire sectors, all activities above a certain size threshold or only 
certain technologies or processes. Determining the coverage is mostly a matter of 
optimisation between environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency and administrative 
burden. Broad coverage facilitates broad emission reductions, reduces the potential for 
intra-sectoral leakage, and promotes economic efficiency since a wider range of mitigation 
options with variable abatement costs will be available (Schneider and Cames, 2009). 
However, it also increases administrative requirements. 
2.3.2 Establishment of Reference Levels 
Reference levels may be defined in absolute amounts of emissions or as emissions indexed 
to economic indicators, such as GDP, tonnes of production etc. (also often referred to as 
relative or intensity targets). A third option is to set technology targets (see e.g. Schneider 
and Cames, 2009; Baron et al., 2009).  
Compared to the other options, absolute targets are relatively easy to administer but 
involve relatively large uncertainties due to the difficulty in predicting emission levels. 
Therefore, they entail a significant risk of over- or under-crediting. Many developing 
 countries rely heavily on manufacturing and commodities, which are more sensitive to 
economic fluctuations than service sectors. As such, growth rates are even more variable 
and difficult to predict in developing than in industrialised countries (Ellis and Moarif, 
2009; Helme et al., 2010). Due to these uncertainties absolute targets may also be 
politically unacceptable to many host countries, which may be afraid of stipulating too 
high levels of ambition. Finally, they lack the flexibility to respond to changes in emissions 
that are not attributable to mitigation action, such as recessions, as currently experienced in 
the EU ETS.  
Indexed targets have the advantage of a lower uncertainty as key emission drivers are 
factored into the target. Hence, they entail a lower risk of over- and under-crediting and 
could be politically more acceptable to host countries as they would not become a “cap on 
growth”. However, establishing an acceptable indexed target may be very difficult in 
complex or diverse sectors where individual installations may have very different levels of 
carbon intensity. In addition, the target value and resulting credits can only be determined 
ex-post, once actual output values have been determined, which increases uncertainty for 
operators and the carbon market. Tying crediting levels to output levels also provides 
incentives to increase output in order to maximise credit generation. Finally, indexed 
targets involve higher transaction costs as both emissions and the index need to be 
monitored. 
Technology targets are defined at a certain level of technology diffusion (e.g. MW 
installed capacity). Setting an appropriate baseline is challenging and always involves a 
degree of arbitrariness; for technologies in early stages of development it may be 
impossible. It also is difficult to estimate in advance how a particular technology will 
actually perform, ex ante emissions estimations are likely to be very approximate. Another 
disadvantage is the relatively narrow scope. However, this approach is relatively simple to 
 administer and may have a higher political feasibility among host countries as it can 
support their interest to promote or develop specific technologies. 
In conclusion, all types of targets have substantial problems. Indexed targets may initially 
be preferable for rapidly industrialising countries to reduce uncertainties, enhance political 
acceptability and minimise the risk of over-crediting. However, limiting climate change 
requires the reduction of absolute emissions. Use of indexed targets should therefore 
arguably be restricted to an introductory road-testing phase for establishing the mechanism, 
with a view to ultimately moving to absolute targets. 
2.3.3 The Relationship of CDM and NMM 
A sectoral scheme should ideally cover all installations in a sector in order to prevent intra-
sectoral leakage. As a result, the scheme could include existing or new CDM projects. This 
creates issues with leakage and double-counting emission reductions as the same 
reductions could be counted under the CDM and the sectoral scheme. Options to address 
these problems are (see also Aasrud et al., 2009; Butzengeiger-Geyer and Michaelowa, 
2009; Schneider and Cames, 2009): 
• Carve out CDM projects from the sectoral NMM boundary. This option would be 
acceptable to project participants and easy to administer. However, there may be 
risks of intra-sectoral leakage due to shifting of production between CDM projects 
and the NMM. This risk would apply particularly if new CDM projects would 
continue to be allowed as investors could choose the scheme that would yield the 
most credits. 
• Do not allow new projects and phase-out existing projects immediately, after their 
current crediting period or after their last crediting period; and until the phase-out 
deduct CERs from the sectoral performance. This option would address double-
 counting adequately and be easy to administer. The best option for eliminating 
leakage would be to immediately phase out CDM in the sector, but project 
participants would probably strongly resist such an approach and would have good 
legal grounds for doing so. 
• Continue CDM including new projects and deduct CERs from the sectoral 
performance. This option would be the most attractive to CDM stakeholders, would 
be easy to administer and would address double counting well. On the other hand, 
as in the first option, there would be risks of intra-sectoral leakage and “system 
shopping” by investors, who could choose the scheme that would yield the most 
credits, potentially challenging the overall environmental effectiveness.  
• Integrate existing CDM projects into a sectoral scheme, e.g. by adapting a CDM 
benchmark to the benchmark for the sectoral scheme. This option would minimise 
intra-sectoral leakage, addresses double counting and promotes environmental 
effectiveness as in contrast to the CDM the NMM aims to achieve net emission 
reductions. Its acceptability to project participants and administrative feasibility 
may be lower than the other options and would probably depend on each specific 
case. 
In summary, from the environmental perspective new CDM projects within the sectoral 
boundary should not be allowed to prevent “system shopping” and credits issued to 
existing projects should be deducted from the sectoral performance. Phasing out existing 
CDM projects before the end of their last possible crediting period might be 
environmentally beneficial but would be politically difficult and the project participants 
could be expected to mount legal challenges against such a decision.  
 2.4 Element 4: National Governance Framework 
National institutions would need to fulfil several functions, including establishment of the 
scheme and its submission for international approval, trading regulation, issuance of 
trading units, verification and stakeholder involvement (for more details see e.g. Aasrud et 
al., 2010; Schneider and Cames, 2009). There are two broad options for governing 
institutions. 
Entrusting a government body with management of the scheme is likely to entail few 
political barriers and medium transaction costs as it could be done by an existing 
government agency. However, as host country governments have an incentive to maximise 
credit generation there are likely risks of baseline inflation, setting weak targets, and weak 
monitoring. Several Annex I countries (Greece, Bulgaria, Romania, Ukraine and 
Lithuania) have in the past been temporarily barred from using the Kyoto mechanisms due 
to the low quality of their emissions accounting (UNFCCC, 2013b). 
Governance by an independent agency beyond government control, similar to a central 
bank, would hence be recommendable to promote environmental effectiveness. However, 
establishing a new agency involves higher transaction costs and host country governments 
would likely want to retain control of the NMM due to the substantial economic impacts 
that it could be expected to have. Moreover, setting international rules for national 
governing agencies would probably come into conflict with sensibilities of host countries 
regarding their national sovereignty.  
In summary, the environmentally preferable option, an independent regulator, may be 
politically infeasible. To limit perverse incentives it would be recommendable to at least 
set criteria for national institutions that ban self-regulation and political influence by the 
regulated entities on the regulator. 
 2.5 Element 5: International Governance Framework 
The central issue for international governance is the competence for approval of national 
proposals and issuance of credits. Options are:  
• The competence of the CDM Executive Board may be extended to cover approval 
of proposals under the NMM. The Board would take approval decisions on its own 
based on COP guidance, similar to the process for registering CDM projects. 
• The approval mandate may be given to a new supervisory body, similar to how the 
CDM Executive Board registers projects. 
• Sectoral proposals could be approved by the COP, potentially on the basis of the 
assessment by a regulatory body (which may be the CDM Executive Board or a 
new body). 
Regulating emission markets is a particular challenge since emission units do not have an 
inherent value. Thus, emission markets mostly lack the competition of interests between 
buyers and sellers over product quality that helps other markets to self-regulate to some 
extent. In emission markets, both buyers and sellers have a common interest to maximise 
the volume of emission units. As such, there is a strong case for entrusting regulation to an 
entity that is independent of governments, which could theoretically be achieved by the 
first two options. Technically, the first two options are essentially the same. The case for a 
new body is mostly political, given that the CDM is a mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol 
while the NMM is to be established under the Convention.  
However, whether such a body would indeed be independent would strongly depend on its 
composition. The CDM Executive Board consists of political candidates nominated by the 
UNFCCC’s regional groups. Fues et al. (2008) find that as a result decisions are 
 substantially influenced by political-economic variables. In particular, Board membership 
of the country or countries involved in a project raises the chance of approval. A body 
composed of full-time professionals might be less subject to being influenced by countries’ 
special interests. However, in terms of political feasibility Parties may want to have a body 
similar to the CDM Executive Board to facilitate continuous political oversight. 
Another consideration is that setting sector-wide emission targets is a rather political 
question and might not be appropriate for a technical body. One may doubt whether in 
particular large countries such as China or India would be willing to have the adequacy of 
their proposals determined by some supervisory body. Therefore, approval by the COP 
may be the politically more adequate option. Such COP decisions would nonetheless 
probably have to be based on an assessment by the regulatory body since the COP would 
hardly be in a position to assess the technical details of baselines and MRV systems by 
itself. One may also doubt whether the COP would be able to process the potentially large 
number of sectoral proposals in a timely manner.  
For the assessment of sectoral proposals, the options include a CDM-like model based on 
auditing companies or a process similar to the Annex I inventory review model: 
assessment by independent experts coordinated by the Secretariat. There is strong criticism 
on the fact that the CDM auditors are selected and paid for by the project participants, 
which leads to an inherent conflict of interest. A similar situation with respect to credit 
rating agencies is often cited as one factor that contributed to the financial crisis (de 
Sépibus and Tuerk, 2011). It also should be noted that the CDM Executive Board has 
deemed it necessary to partly replicate the work of the auditors by two further layers of 
scrutiny by the Secretariat and by a review and issuance team (RIT), which is a team of 
external experts that assist the Board in assessing projects. The RIT is in general terms 
 comparable to the roster of experts which the Secretariat draws on for the in-depth reviews 
of Annex I inventories. 
In summary, again the environmentally preferable option, regulation by an independent 
body, is probably politically infeasible. Maintenance of impartiality may thus have to rely 
on provisions for transparency and stakeholder involvement. As for the detailed technical 
assessment of proposals, assessment teams should not be paid by NMM participants to 
prevent conflicts of interest. Therefore, the Annex I inventory review model seems 
preferable to the CDM model.  
3 Insights from Country Showcases 
The following examines NMM feasibility in four sectors in five developing countries: the 
power sector in Chile and South Africa, the steel sector in Brazil, the refineries sector in 
Indonesia and the cement sector in Vietnam. The most important criterion in the selection 
of sectors and countries was the availability of data on emission sources, sectoral emission 
levels, abatement costs and national policies. In addition, the aim was to include different 
sectors in different geographies.  
The underlying research was conducted as desk studies based on publicly available 
information. It had two main objectives. The first objective was to identify whether there is 
sufficient reliable data available to perform the detailed emissions accounting that is 
required for a mechanism based on the use of tradable emission units. For this purpose the 
national communications were analysed and experts were consulted to determine the 
availability of further data. The second objective was to identify what impact the NMM 
could have in the respective country/sector contexts. This is a question of the size and cost 
of the available mitigation potential and of whether there exist substantial non-price 
barriers to investment, such as non-competitive market structures. To answer these 
 questions the research surveyed publicly available information on the available mitigation 
potential, mitigation costs and sectoral market conditions.  
3.1 Data Availability and Consistency 
Consistent and reliable data on emissions from installations in a specific sector is crucial 
for the design and successful operation of the NMM. Such data is not always available. 
The national communications do not always provide sufficient information on emissions at 
the sector level. In addition, in most national communications the data is not current and is 
available only up until 2000 or 2005, at the latest. However, this situation will probably 
improve soon due to the implementation of the stricter reporting requirements stipulated in 
the Cancún Agreements. There may also be more information available nationally than is 
reflected in the UNFCCC reporting. Nonetheless, without external review it is unclear 
whether such undisclosed data, if it exists, is more accurate than the publicly available 
data. 
Cross-checking the national communications with other data sources in some cases 
revealed inconsistencies. For Chile, while the second national communication puts national 
2006 emissions at about 59.6 Mt CO2-eq. (Chile 2011), a study from the University of 
Chile puts 2006 emissions at more than 63 Mt CO2-eq. (O’Ryan et al.). For Indonesia, the 
second national communication reports 2005 emissions of about 135 Mt from electricity 
generation, petroleum and gas refining (Indonesia 2010), while a study from the National 
Council on Climate Change puts 2005 emissions at 110 Mt CO2-eq. for electricity 
generation and an additional 91 Mt CO2-eq. for petroleum and gas refining (DNPI 2010).  
In all cases, it therefore seems that targeted and detailed sector-specific studies are needed 
before an NMM could be successfully implemented. These conclusions are in line with 
earlier studies, which have also identified data availability and quality as a key bottleneck 
 in many countries (e.g. Butzengeiger-Geyer et al., 2010; Helme et al., 2010; Cai et al., 
2012). 
3.2 Abatement Costs and Carbon Price 
The NMM aims to expose sectors to a carbon price, which creates a financial incentive for 
investments in emission reductions. The research found that at moderate carbon prices as 
are currently prevailing, only a few abatement options are made financially feasible in 
addition to what is already feasible without a carbon market incentive. The research also 
showed that many abatement options may be economically profitable even without a 
carbon price, which would cast doubt on the potential of price-based instruments to 
effectively incentivise these options. The results need to be taken with a grain of salt, given 
the limitations of data availability and quality noted in the previous section, but the general 
direction should be valid.  
In Indonesia and Vietnam most abatement potential actually appears to be profitable even 
without a carbon price. In Indonesia, according to DNPI (2010), energy efficiency, 
improved maintenance and similar measures could reduce 2030 emissions from refineries 
by ca. 13.5% below BAU levels at profits of around 70 USD/tCO2-eq. and more. Similar 
volumes of reductions could be achieved by the installation of cogeneration at refineries 
that are using waste heat at a cost of only 6 USD/tCO2-eq. For Vietnam, IGES and TERI 
(2011) estimate that cement sector emissions could be reduced by ca. 15 Mt CO2-eq. by 
2020 at negative costs through the substitution of clinker with fly ash, fuel switch to gas 
and biomass, and cogeneration. 
South Africa also has substantial no-regret and low-cost mitigation potential according to 
the official Long-Term Mitigation Scenarios study, which estimated reduction potential 
over the period 2003-2050. The study also estimated associated mitigation costs relating to 
 different assumptions on discount rates, with 10% used as central case (costs are given in 
Rand in the study, here translated into USD at current exchange rates). The potential of 
commercial energy efficiency is estimated at on average 8 Mt CO2-eq. per year, at 
mitigation costs of about -22 USD/t. Estimated mitigation costs of industrial and 
residential efficiency are also negative but figures are not differentiated according to types 
of energy used. Average annual CO2 savings from increasing the share of renewable 
electricity to 27% by 2050 are estimated at 42 Mt CO2-eq. at costs of about 6 USD/t 
without assuming technological learning, and at 57 Mt CO2-eq. at costs of -16 USD/t when 
assuming technological learning. Increasing the renewable electricity share to 50% by 
2050 leads to an estimated 68 Mt CO2-eq./yr, at costs of about 10 USD/t without and about 
0.33 USD/t with learning. The reduction potential of “cleaner coal” is estimated at 3 Mt 
CO2-eq./yr at costs of about –0.33 USD/t (Hughes et al. 2007). 
According to McKinsey (2010), the Brazilian steel sector has a no-regret energy efficiency 
and coke substitution potential of about 6.5 Mt CO2–eq. in 2030 but the vast majority of 
the abatement potential (35 Mt CO2–eq.) comes at a price of over 20 EUR/t CO2-eq., 
through the introduction of more efficient machinery and processes or carbon capture and 
storage (CCS). Also in Chile the no-regret potential is small. O’Ryan et al. (2010) see 4 Mt 
CO2-eq. of mitigation potential from new hydropower by 2030 at a cost of -32 USD/t, but 
about 32 Mt CO2-eq. from other renewables, nuclear power and CCS at costs of 19 to 65 
USD/t CO2-eq. The international carbon price would need to increase substantially above 
current levels to make these technologies financially feasible. 
3.3 Sectoral Market Readiness 
In a well-functioning market, investments that represent financially viable options would 
be developed to reduce the costs of production. That existence of ‘no-regret’ potential 
suggests that there are some ‘non-price barriers’, or ‘hidden costs’.  
 A relevant factor is probably that most of the sectors considered are either state-owned or 
have highly concentrated private ownership. In Chile, in the two most important regional 
grids, 90% and 95% of the respective generation capacity is under the control of three 
holding companies (IEA, 2009). In Indonesia, the majority of the country’s refining 
capacity is controlled by a single state-owned entity, Pertamina (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 
2012). In South Africa, electricity production is basically a state-owned monopoly, with 
Eskom producing about 96% of the electricity (South Africa, 2011). The Vietnamese 
cement sector is being transferred from a centrally-planned, state-run enterprise into a 
market economy with different players. However, the state-owned Vietnamese Cement 
Industry Corporation (VICEM) still controls most of the industry (Edwards, 2012).  
This state dominance in three of the five cases may limit the ability of installation 
operators to make commercial choices and react to the market incentives which the NMM 
aims to provide. For the South African case this is confirmed by Goldblatt (2011), who 
argues that, “it is apparent that the existence of concentrated energy supply markets, 
monopoly power in electricity generation, and a small number of liquid fuels refineries 
impose serious concerns about the ability to construct a competitive, liquid and efficient 
emissions trading market.” 
A price-based mechanism, such as an NMM, can help to overcome such non-price barriers 
by offering an incentive to address them and increasing financial benefits to help overcome 
hidden costs. Nonetheless, effective removal of non-price barriers usually also requires 
application of dedicated policy instruments that directly address those barriers (Gupta et 
al., 2007). The sale of tradable units from the NMM could provide revenues for the 
development of policies that remove non-price barriers. 
 However, the government would accrue international revenue from sale of surplus units 
only once emissions have been successfully reduced, while it would incur the cost of 
removing non-price barriers ex ante. Carbon market finance might therefore need to be 
blended with other sources of finance, for example in the form of nationally appropriate 
mitigation actions (NAMAs) supported by industrialised countries. In addition, the 
government could source domestic revenues if it used domestic price-based instruments to 
achieve the NMM target, such as carbon taxation or a domestic emission trading system 
with auctioning. 
4 Conclusions 
This article aimed to identify key design options for the NMM based on a survey of the 
literature and to assess what options would be best suited to maximise environmental 
effectiveness and integrity as well as economic efficiency. Furthermore, potential 
application of the NMM was analysed for five country-sector combinations. 
While there often are trade-offs, several design options recommend themselves for 
maximising mitigation outcomes and economic efficiency. Where administratively feasible 
broad coverage facilitates large-scale emission reductions, reduces the potential for intra-
sectoral leakage, and promotes economic efficiency since a wider range of mitigation 
options with variable abatement costs will be available. Starting with indexed instead of 
absolute targets may help to enhance political acceptability and minimise the risk of over-
crediting. However, as limiting climate change requires the reduction of absolute 
emissions, use of indexed targets should arguably be restricted to an introductory road-
testing phase for establishing the mechanism. Keeping crediting/trading periods short helps 
to avoid long-term lock-in of low ambition. While politically difficult, establishing 
independent governance bodies nationally and internationally would be recommendable as 
 emission reductions have no inherent economic value and NMM participants have hence 
no inherent economic interest to safeguard environmental integrity. New CDM projects 
should not be allowed within NMM boundaries and credits issued to existing projects 
should be deducted from the sectoral performance in order to prevent double counting and 
“system shopping”. 
The timeline for implementing the NMM is likely to be relatively long, even once 
agreement under the UNFCCC has been reached. The NMM will be a new instrument and 
substantial data is needed to assess the possible impact of the NMM on a sector, determine 
an appropriate target, and to divide the target among installations. As noted, one study 
estimated lead times of up to 5 years (Butzengeiger-Geyer et al., 2010). The assessment of 
five specific country-sector combinations in this article confirms that availability and 
reliability of data is indeed often a key barrier. While there may be more information 
available within governments, without external review it is unclear whether such 
undisclosed data, if it exists, is more accurate than the publicly available data. 
The mechanism would probably have to be operated by the host country government as 
private entities could hardly take responsibility for entire sectors. The host countries’ 
operational framework would therefore be key for the constitution of actual emission 
reduction incentives. A hybrid of emission pricing and other policies and measures 
arguably provides the best prospect for maximising both environmental effectiveness and 
economic efficiency. Systems based only on emission prices can be expected to maximise 
short-term economic efficiency but entail a risk of neglecting long-term considerations.  
In addition, a sector may not be receptive to carbon price incentives at the moment as 
either the incentives to improve the efficiency of operations or the means to do so may be 
lacking, for example due to the existence of monopolies/oligopolies. The investigation of 
 the five country-sector combinations showed that according to the existing data there 
seems to be a large commercially viable abatement potential that is left untouched. This 
situation indicates the existence of strong non-price barriers or hidden costs, which would 
first have to be addressed before an NMM could have the intended impact. While price-
based mechanisms can help to overcome non-price barriers by offering an incentive to 
address them and increasing financial benefits, effective removal of non-price barriers 
usually also requires application of dedicated policy instruments. 
In the short term, strengthening an existing and successful policy could be an effective 
approach for countries where market-based mechanisms are unlikely to be able to 
incentivise mitigation action in the current sector conditions. If certain policies, like sector 
reform, have demonstrated to have the intended effect, the NMM can support the up-
scaling of these policies. For example, if a government has a preferential feed-in tariff for 
power generated with renewables, the NMM could help provide the financial means to 
increase the price differential with power from fossil sources or the scope of the policy, 
either in terms of more expensive technologies or in terms of volume. A practical example 
is the “GET FiT Uganda “ programme, whereby an existing but commercially unattractive 
FIT is “topped up” by international donors (GET FiT Uganda Website).  
Puhl (2011) suggests a concept for the integration of an FIT with carbon finance. The 
concept is based on the situation in Thailand, which introduced an FIT in 2005 and 
consequently saw a rapid increase of the share of renewable electricity from originally 
about 6% to about 14% in 2012. The cost of this policy has been borne by consumers and 
tax payers, which has led to strong political pressure to reduce these costs. Co-funding with 
carbon market revenue would reduce the national cost impact of the policy and thus allow 
its further up-scaling. Such a system would require less preparation than an entirely new 
programme because the institutional capacity is already largely in place.  
 Major additional insights could be gained by carrying out one or more real-world pilots for 
implementing an NMM. Such pilots could seek to take existing approaches like Thailand’s 
FIT as starting point and should ideally generate tradable and compliance-grade emission 
credits in order to fully simulate the real-life conditions of an NMM. The generation of 
compliance-grade credits would probably also be necessary to achieve participation by 
private companies, as was the case in the World Bank’s Prototype Carbon Fund.  
However, as actual demand for additional credits is currently very low, pilots could 
alternatively be developed as supported NAMAs, but with carbon market-level MRV and 
the perspective to translate the supported NAMAs into a market-based approach in the 
mid-term. To simulate market operations, such pilots could generate non-compliance 
credits to be purchased by the funding organisations or governments. Such an approach 
would be akin to results-based finance models which have been developed in international 
development cooperation, of which the GET FiT Uganda programme is one example, and 
the potential of which for climate finance is now being explored (see e.g. Kossoy et al., 
2013). 
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